TL;DR Passkeys protect the moment you sign in, not the session cookie that keeps you signed in afterwards. Malware can copy that cookie and replay it from another machine. Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC), a W3C draft now shipping in Chrome, ties the session to a key in your laptop’s TPM or Secure Enclave. The cookie lasts minutes and only the device holding the key can renew it, so a stolen copy goes stale on its own. Caution’s dashboard now uses DBSC, and sensitive changes still require a fresh passkey confirmation.
Table of contents
Why a passkey alone isn’t enough
Most of the work in web authentication goes into the moment you sign in: passwords, then one-time codes, then passkeys. Caution signs you in with a passkey, so there is no password to phish and no code to relay.
After sign-in, the server hands your browser a session cookie. Every later request carries it, and the server treats whoever presents it as you. Nothing in the cookie ties it to your machine: copy it to another computer and it works there too, for as long as it lives.
That cookie is what infostealer malware goes after. It reads the browser’s cookie store, sends it to a remote server, and the account is used later from somewhere else. As Google put it when it announced DBSC: “Cookie theft like this happens after login, so it bypasses two-factor authentication.” The stolen cookie also keeps working after the malware is cleaned up.
What DBSC does
DBSC is a protocol between the browser and the website, specified at the W3C and shipped in Chrome 146. It changes one thing: the session cookie stops being the whole credential.
- A key the device won’t hand over. At login, Chrome creates a key pair for this one session. The private key lives in the TPM on Windows or the Secure Enclave on a Mac. The chip will sign with it but never export it: not to the site, not to you, not to malware.
- A cookie that expires quickly. The site swaps the long-lived cookie for one that lasts minutes. A copy goes stale before it is worth much.
- A refresh only the device can do. When the short cookie expires, Chrome asks for a new one by signing a fresh challenge from the server with the private key. No signature, no new cookie.
The cookie can still be copied. What the thief gets is a credential with minutes left on it and no way to renew it.
Each session gets its own key, and the server only sees the public half. Keys from different sessions on the same device can’t be linked, so DBSC gives sites no new way to track you.
How DBSC works
Two exchanges, both over ordinary HTTP headers: registration once at sign-in, then a refresh each time the short cookie expires.
The private key never leaves the chip; only signatures do. Every renewal needs a new one over a fresh challenge, which a copied cookie cannot supply.
Why stolen cookies still work briefly
This year, Mozilla took a negative position on DBSC, citing the weakness we flagged above: “It leaves a window in which an attacker can use a stolen session cookie.” Mozilla would rather every request carry a signature, so a copied cookie is worthless from the first second.
Google’s reply is that it explored per-request signing and found it infeasible at scale, and that post-quantum signatures will make it harder still. A browser sends a great many requests, and most of them only read a page.
Both are right, about different requests. Signing every page view is costly. Signing the few requests behind sensitive actions is cheap. So we do both.
What’s changed in Caution
Caution’s gateway sorts requests into two classes.
- Changes like adding a key need a passkey tap. Adding or removing an SSH key, PGP key or passkey, changing quorum bundles or organization settings, and switching a deployment each need a fresh passkey signature over that request. The session cookie alone is refused. This is Mozilla’s model, applied where it counts.
- Everything else rides the session, now bound to the device. When DBSC is active in Chrome on Windows or macOS, the dashboard cookie lasts 10 minutes and only the device that signed in can renew it.
You stay signed in for the day, as before, with nothing to set up. No private key ever leaves the hardware: not the passkey, not the session key.
In Chrome on Windows or macOS, sign in to the Caution dashboard and open DevTools, then Application, then Cookies. When DBSC is active, caution_session expires within 10 minutes and quietly renews. Delete it, and the next request gets a fresh one, signed by your laptop.
What this protection does not cover
DBSC limits how long a stolen cookie can be used, but it doesn’t protect every situation. Here’s where the limits are.
- Malware still on the laptop. While it runs, it can drive the browser or ask the chip to sign. What it loses is the ability to carry the session elsewhere and keep using it after it has been removed, which is where most of the damage happens: steal now, use later, from another machine.
- Before a copied cookie expires. A copied cookie can still be used until it expires, for up to 10 minutes. Changes that require a fresh passkey confirmation cannot be authorized with the copied cookie alone.
- Malware there before you sign in. DBSC binds the session to a key at sign-in. If malware already controls the browser then, it can bind the session to a key it controls instead of your laptop’s chip, as the DBSC spec notes. Chrome’s documentation rates this as much harder to pull off, and easier to detect, than ordinary cookie theft. A session taken this way still can’t make sensitive changes without a passkey tap.
- Browsers without DBSC support. Firefox, Safari and Chrome on Linux don’t support DBSC today. In those browsers, or when Chrome doesn’t activate it for your session, Caution keeps an ordinary 24-hour session cookie. A fresh passkey confirmation is still required for the same changes, even without DBSC.
- The CLI. The Caution CLI keeps its own session token, which DBSC cannot bind because there is no browser. A copied CLI token still works until it expires, but the same changes need a passkey tap there too.